THE FUNCTIONING OF PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONS AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY AND THE OPPOSITION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Abstract

Background. In contemporary democratic political systems, effective interaction between the parliamentary majority and the opposition is critical in ensuring legislative stability and institutional effectiveness. The constitutional and legal frameworks that regulate this interaction not only define the organization of the legislative process but also influence the parliament's ability to respond to dynamic political environments and maintain a balance of interests among diverse political forces. Conversely, the absence of clear legal mechanisms for regulating majority – opposition relations may lead to political instability, hinder institutional development, and cause dysfunctions within the broader public governance system.

Methods. This study employs comparative analysis to examine models of parliamentary interaction in selected European countries, with particular attention to jurisdictions that have developed effective approaches to balancing majority and opposition interests. Analyzing relevant legal and regulatory frameworks enables the identification of best practices in institutionalizing majority – opposition cooperation.

Results. The findings indicate that formalizing the rights and responsibilities of both the parliamentary majority and opposition contributes to the efficiency of the legislative process and overall parliamentary stability. Comparative insights reveal that institutional models across Europe result from gradual evolution shaped by the historical development of national constitutional systems. The Westminster model in the United Kingdom is characterized by a high degree of formalization of the opposition's role, including the institution of the shadow cabinet and the official recognition of the opposition leader. In Germany, the opposition operates within a clearly defined procedural framework, while in France, limited institutionalization is partially compensated by specific parliamentary oversight mechanisms. The type of opposition – political, procedural, or ideological – directly affects the nature of its engagement with the majority. Political traditions and culture further influence the extent to which such interaction is institutionally embedded. In the context of Ukrainian parliamentary traditions, implementing recommendations from the Venice Commission, approved by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, has contributed to recognizing opposition rights. Nonetheless, further legal regulation of the functioning of parliamentary majorities and opposition factions, informed by European experience, would create more favorable conditions for constructive interaction.

Conclusions. The results underscore the need to improve the constitutional and legal framework governing majority – opposition relations to enhance the stability and functionality of parliamentary institutions. Essential conditions for effective cooperation include a high level of political culture among parliamentary actors, appropriate legal regulation, and the development of stable parliamentary practices. The Westminster model represents the most balanced synthesis of institutional and political mechanisms, ensuring government accountability and a constructive opposition role. In contrast, the French model illustrates a more fragmented opposition influence, partially offset by extra parliamentary instruments of political engagement. These findings highlight the importance of institutionalizing legal mechanisms for majority – opposition interaction as a precondition for democratic governance, a stable legislative process, and preserving political pluralism.